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Review Essay
Mimetic Faces: On Luiz Costa Lima's
The Control of the Imaginary
Alberto Moreiras
University of Wisconsin-Madison

In his Afterword to The Control of the Imaginary Jochen Schulte-Sasse
elaborates a critique of mimesis that apparently goes against the very heart
of Luiz Costa Lima's argumentation. For Schulte-Sasse artistic imagination
in modernity "can no longer be perceived as mimetic in the sense of an
artistic appropriation of reality" (220). Art as revelation is fully dependent
upon the existence of a transcendent anchor for human life. The postEnlightenment practice of art, founded as it is on expressiveness, has a
negative function insofar as it resists "the atrophy of thinking by the
conditioning force of instrumental reason" (220). Mimesis can only work in
favor of the legitimation of social power: "If modern art is indeed institutionalized in such a way that our commerce with it is compensatory in
nature, then any effect a socially relevant, i. e., mimetic content might have
will a priori be defused by its mode of institutionalization" (219). In my
opinion, however, Costa Lima's elaboration of the notion of mimesis allows
for a different interpretation of this problematic.
In Mimesis e modernidade (1980) Costa Lima offers a definition of
mimesis that can function as the framework for his intellectual enterprise:
"Mimesis, presupposing a similarity with the real understood as the possible, is a means for the self-recognition of the community, that is, an
instrument of social identity" (21).1 The link between mimesis and community will give us a privileged point of entry into The Control of the Imaginary.
The book itself, as I see it, responds to endemic problems in Latin American
critical circles regarding the political function of art, and in particular the
contribution of literature to the constitution of social identity. By studying
mimesis, Costa Lima does not want Latin American literature to fall into the
trap of devoting itself, and therefore limiting itself, to the hopeless task of
reproducing moralizing recipes for social and political redemption under
the pretext of a recourse to the real, understood as the reality of oppression.
On the other hand, and precisely by studying mimesis, Costa Lima wants to
free literature, from a theoretical perspective, into the full scope of its
intrinsic possibilities, up to and including a fundamental resistance to the
understanding of its capacity as merely compensatory in nature. Mimesis,
in the sense in which Costa Lima understands the term, does not primarily
bespeak an appropriation of reality in the work of art, but an entrance into,
and a dwelling in, the order of the real.2
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In "Critical Fanonism" Henry Louis Gates Jr. identifies a situation of
impasse or double bind which clearly plagues theoretical thinking about
what he calls the "colonial paradigm" (457):

You can empower discursively the native, and open yourself to charges
of downplaying the epistemic (and literal) violence of colonialism; or
play up the absolute nature of colonial domination, and be open to
charges of negating the subjectivity and agency of the colonized, thus
textually replicating the repressive operations of colonialism. (462)
In my opinion, Costa Lima's concern with mimesis represents a sustained
attempt to break out of this impasse. lie himself mentions the importance
of mimesis for the postcolonial world:

Mimesis is also a question for those of us who live in the periphery [para
quem tem a periferia canto seu lugar]. . Since, traditionally, mimesis is
translated out of imitario, our mimesis becomes imitation of an imitation, taking us to value our cultural products according to their
conformity with metropolitan patterns. Or, if we are rebellious to them,
according to their disconformity.... In both cases, the assessment of
colonial mimesis does not depend upon the matter on which it feedslet us provisionally call it "life," or "reality"-but upon the metropolitan pattern, which dictates how "reality" must be "imitated" or interpreted. (Mimesis 2)

Whether we are for or against "metropolitan patterns," Costa Lima is
telling us, we remain caught in the spiderweb of imitation and all its
dependent problematic. Whether we decide that the colonial subject can or
should develop a discourse of resistance or we deem such a subject entirely
exhausted by colonial oppression, it is still mimesis understood as imitatio
that rules our thought and forces us to follow ourselves into a dead end.
In our historical context, reviving mimesis means first of all breaking
away from imitatio, therefore in a sense repeating a gesture begun but not
totally carried out by European Romanticism. Mimesis in poststructuralist
times is, for Costa Lima, the figure of a break. In the first chapter of The
Control of the Imaginary Costa Lima retraces the history of mimesis as
imitatio in order to show that imitatio was in fact forgotten as a regulative
idea after "the passage from an aristocratic, estate society to a national, class
society articulated by the scientific spirit" (45). If expression replaces
imitation for Romantic poetics, it is clear that "the romantic cult of
individual expression transformed itself into the immanentist aesthetics
that dominated uncontested the first sixty years of the present century"
(45). Now that immanentist aesthetics have reached a fundamental crisis (a
crisis which Costa Lima finds all the more evident "after the vogue of
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol17/iss1/10
structuralism"), it is time, he thinks, to return to the old concept whose
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1316
erroneous translation ruled several centuries of Western poetics. This
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schema already hints at the fact that what is at issue is not so much a return
to mimesis as a return of mimesis. In other words, it is not that we return to
mimesis, but that mimesis comes back to haunt our accomplished

immanentism.
The return of mimesis depends then upon the breakdown of modernity the exhaustion of the expressionist poetics which are a corollary of a
subject understood as res cogitans. "From the moment when the originally
Nietzschean and later Freudian critique of the doctrine grounded in cogito
ergo sum was disseminated, ... the conditions were created under which
precisely what mimesis implies could be rethought" (133): "In concrete
terms, mimesis is a strategy directed against the indissolubility of the
presence of the 'self" (133).
As a strategy against fixed selves, mimesis is first of all a rendering of
difference and not of identity. For mimesis to become expressively productive "the mimetizing object must elicit not only the indispensable clement
of the mimetized agent's identification but also that agent's own recognition-not necessarily a conscious recognition-of the resistance that is
being presented to it: recognition of the mimetizing source's difference"
(185).
The emphasis on difference, no doubt surprising to the traditional
theory of mimesis, indicates that a source other than Aristotle is being put
to use. The source is Freud, to whose notion of identification Costa Lima
refers briefly but decisively. According to Freud, there are three basic
possibilities for identification: identification with a rival object, implying the
desire to take his or her place; identification with a love object, implying the
desire to be possessed by her or him; and an identification, more mysterious,
which "entirely leaves out of account any object-relation to the person who
is being copied" (Costa Lima 49).3 The existence of this third kind of
identification grounds the whole mechanism upon the mere desire of
putting oneself somewhere else: this third identification is what Walter
Benjamin would refer to abstractly as "the mimetic faculty." What Costa
Lima here emphasizes is the fact that what is essential in identificatory
mimesis "is not its nature as copy or substantive trace but the process of
transformation that is in operation" (49). "What is decisive in the constitution of mimesis . . . is the creation of a staging, which is not so much the
repetition of a model as the organization of a response to that model" (50).
Under these determinations it is hard to see how Schulte-Sasse could
have taken it for granted that a defense of "the mimetic nature of art" was
equivalent to a defense of the "artistic appropriation of reality" in the
subjectivistic, agential sense. Rather, following the logic of Costa Lima's
admittedly abrupt articulations, we could say that mimesis is for him a
displacement into the other, in which the other, which only appears in the
form of a wound, forces a response which, far from being an attempt at
appropriation, is first of all a pure staging of desire: the pure form of
staging.4
Published
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This is not to say that Costa Lima's theory of mimesis runs counter to
that of Aristotle. It does not run counter to it, but it is not identical with it
either: "Obviously," he says in the preface to the English edition, "there can
be no way to recuperate ... and restore the Greek sense of mimesis, for the
very mentality of modern times, and within it the way that physis is conceived, has dramatically changed" (viii). But there is a crucial aspect of the
Aristotelian notion of mimesis which, although repressed and forgotten in
the traditional understanding of mimesis as imitatio, is precisely what is
recuperated in Costa Lima's notion of mimesis as a staging: "Aristotelian
mimesis presupposed a concept ofphysic (to simplify, let us say of "nature")
that contained two aspects: natura naturata and natura naturans, respectively, the actual and the potential. Mimesis had relation only to the possible,
the capable of being created-to energeia; its limits were those of conceivability alone" (22). However, the field of conceivability, which sets the stage
for the deployment of mimesis, does not coincide with the field of desire.
Conceivability here is desire mediated by the possibility of expression, the
possibility of construction of a socially articulable mimema. As Costa Lima's
intention is to speak about mimesis as articulated in the literary artwork, he
calls "the fictional" the artistic product of mimesis. The fictional is for Costa
Lima the artistic mimema.
Before going on to discuss the fictional and several related notions, I
would like to comment briefly on Benjamin's essay on the mimetic function.
Although Costa Lima does not refer to it explicitly, there are grounds to
argue that it is a major text in the genesis of Costa Lima's version of the
concept. In any event, it will give me the chance to point out several crucial
implications of The Control of the Imaginary.
The human capacity to see resemblances, Benjamin says, "is nothing
other than a rudiment of the powerful compulsion in former times to
become and behave like something else" (333). This old compulsion, which
we have already seen invoked in Costa Lima's notion of mimesis as staging,
is undergoing, according to Benjamin, a historical change: "The direction
of this change seems definable as the increasing decay of the mimetic
faculty" (334). This decay, in Benjamin's idiolect, does not testify to an
absolute waning, but rather to a transformation, much like what happens to
his notion of artistic "aura" in the age of mechanical rcproduction.5 The
transformation of the mimetic faculty follows the lines of a progressive
abandonment of cosmology as an "ethical" discipline. "Nevertheless we,
too, possess a canon according to which the meaning of nonsensuous
similarity can be at least partly clarified. And this canon is language" (334).
Benjamin's notion of nonsensuous similarity, developed from the idea
that "the whole of language is onomatopoeic" (335), has been misunderstood, but most of all disregarded in the context of an appreciation of
mimesis. I will argue that it is of extraordinary importance: it gives us the
possibility to lay the radical claim that mimesis "under conditions of
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol17/iss1/10
modernity" is still a means to enter the order of the real. Benjamin does not
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1316
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tional sense. On the contrary, its meaning is circumscribed, as it can be
understood as merely the material field of mediation "between the spoken
and the signified but also between the written and the signified, and equally
between the spoken and the written" (335). Benjamin's strongest thought
comes in this:

The mimetic element in language can, like a flame, manifest itself only
through a kind of bearer. This bearer is the semiotic element. Thus the
coherence of words or sentences is the bearer through which, like a
flash, similarity appears. For its production by man-like its perception by him-is in many cases, and particularly the most important,
limited to flashes. It flits past. It is not improbable that the rapidity of
writing and reading heightens the fusion of the semiotic and the
mimetic in the sphere of language. (336)
It follows that mimesis does not seek an appropriation of reality, but
that it forms the conditions under which the real-in a flash-can come into
the mimetic exchange. Schulte-Sasse maintains that one of the premises of
the mimetic notion of art is "the effacement of the materiality and arbitrariness of language" (224). He is clearly operating under the notion of mimesis
as imitatio. In Benjamin's, and Costa Lima's, understanding, the materiality
of language becomes crucial to mimesis, for it is there that the possibility of
nonsensuous similarity resides. Nonphenomenal materiality, to use an
expression coined by the late Paul de Man, is the key to the mimema's, or,
if you will, the fictional's presencing of the real .6
Costa Lima follows Jean -Paul Sartre in considering the imaginary "one
of the two forms of thematization of the world" (the other one being the
perceptual) (ix). "Between mimesis and fictional precipitation," that is,
between mimesis and the mimema,"lies the imaginary" (ix). The imaginary,
in concordance with the mimetic faculty's desire to be always somewhere
else, thematizes things as absent. This is what Costa Lima names "the
negation of the imaginary," in a subjective sense: it is the imaginary that
negates. But it is precisely because this negation by the imaginary concretizes into the mimema, "because the fictional concretizes in a text that
materializes in a signifying organization," that the fictional can be considered a negation of the imaginary's negation: the materiality of the fictional
is radically upheld, and it is indeed only thanks to it that the fictional can be
considered "a critical use of the imaginary" (ix).
In what sense is it critical? This question introduces the last aspect of
Costa Lima's work that I want to comment upon before concluding this
review wi th some critical remarks. Because the fictional is a critical affirmation
of the imaginary, it is not primarily concerned with issues of truth. Or rather:
its aletheological import is not one that goes through the choice between
truth and falsehood. As a critical affirmation of the imaginary, and thus as
a material opening into absence, the fictional interrogates or even solicits
Published
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does not contain the choice between true and false" (ix), just as Benjamin
had asserted that "play" is the school of the mimetic faculty in the ontogenetic sense (333). Herein resides the threat of the fictional, and therefore
the cause of what Costa Lima identifies as the "veto," the "prohibition" or
the "control" of the imaginary by the dominant discourses through history.
It can now be stated that the translation of mimesis as imitario is not
innocent: the verisimilar depends on what is, the actual, understood as the
true, and so the traditional theory of mimesis, by putting the mimema under
the sway of truth, forces mimesis to abandon its critical use, which radically

depends upon imaginary conceivability.
I started my presentation of Costa Lima's text by quoting a definition
of mimesiswhich seemed togive it a preeminent function in the constitution
of social identity. The link between mimesis and com mu nity stil I needs to be
developed. It is here that I find Costa Lima's efforts objectionable, in the
sense that I believe that he falls back upon mimesis as Unitutio precisely
where it is most important that he resist it.
If "mimesis ... is a process whose concretization is established under
the form of fiction" (53), the limits of fiction depend upon psycho-social
meaning. Costa Lima refers to the socialization theories of Marcel Mauss
and Emile Durkheim, who had tried to establish that "to be socialized is
... to internalize classificatory networks that locate the individual along the
different scales . . . within the social environment. Mimesis is, first and
foremost, one-or the-mode of learning socialization, that is, a mode of
internalizing social values" (viii). It is in this context that we must understand the previously-quoted remark to the effect that mimesis operates as
an instrument of social identity.
We can see the need for this sort of gesture: without it, it would be
difficult for Costa Lima to ground politically his critique of traditionally
understood mimesis. The "new" mimesis, the one that Costa Lima is
defining, by breaking away from imitatio as well as from a poetics of
immanentist expression, would open the way to a new understanding of
literature that would be in agreement with changed social expectations. This
fact is particularly important for societies trying to get rid of an oppressive
colonial heritage. Thus, even if mimesis is "the production of difference"

(ix),
it is, however, not an idiosyncratic difference similar to an idiolect but
a socially recognizable, potentially acceptable difference. Recognizable and acceptable according to the expectations engendered in the
members of a given community by the criteria of classification in force
of that community. (ix)
But we also see that this gesture creates a new impasse --or better, it
returns us to the oldest of problems, which we can summarize as the conflict
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol17/iss1/10
between logos understood as social authority and ethos understood as the
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1316
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community ultimately depend upon the most obvious of all imitations, the
imitation of authority. By invoking socialization as the limit of fictionality,
Costa Lima unexpectedly reintroduces mimesis as imaatio: the fictional, at
the end of Costa Lima's theory, must still be proper, in the sense of
conforming to social expectations. But the proper, even within rapidly
changing or even revolutionary societies, will not be dissociated from
property, now understood not only as the control of the means of production, but also as the control of the very site of social territoriality: the site of
ethics.

Vince Gugino has recently demonstrated that this problem, which I
take to be fundamental not only for Costa Lima's work, but also in terms of
its importance for any attempts at a postmetaphysical literary and political
thinking, is quite intractable within the frame of a theory of mimesis.
After showing the probable etymological origin of mimesis in a constellation of terms meaning "change, exchange and substitution," Gugino
remarks:
As exchange and the entire ensemble of the associations of exchange
(imitation, copy, representation, etc.), mimesis is not itself exchanged.
Mimesis does not enter into the transaction, but walks off unaltered.
This not -being -affected is the source of Plato's horror of mimesis and
of his acceptance of its power. The power of mimesis is the possibility
of exchange without reciprocity, an exchange which is instead unilateral, appropriative and ruling. (126)

It

is mimesis which defines property, not the mimetizing object or the
mimetized agent, since "adcquation and assimilation of that which has been
made like occurs as an appropriation of the differences of the material or
being entering into the mimetic exchange" (128).
It is therefore the very notion of mimesis as a staging that comes under
question: "Mimetic space, as field, theatre or stage, or as chora .. presents
a question of where exchange happens and at the same time becomes that
'where' or space created by mi met is exchange itself' ( 132). The spatializat ion
of mimetic exchange comes to be seen in late Greek metaphysics, and in the
subsequent philosophical tradition, as the political place. Costa Lima, as we
have seen, agrees with this determination. But if the political place, the site
of community, comes under the sway of mimesis, and if mimesis, as the
staging effect, is the name of the non-participating appropriation (even if
the mimetized agent is not itself e ffecting it, as we saw earlier), then it is clear
that mimesis is also the field of determination of the ascendancy of the
logical as ruling principle. Costa Lima may not be wrong in relating mimesis
to networks of psycho-social meaning. But by placing that relation under the
logos of socialization, Costa Lima's theory of mimesis cannot be but
logocentric.
Is it possible to pull mimesis apart from logos as absolute appropriaPublished
NewasPrairie
Press
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(121). Whether the question is answered positively, as does Gugino taking
his point of departure in Anaxagoras' notion of met/lair ("participation"),
or in the negative, as Costa Lima clearly implies, we must be aware of the
fact that "reviving mimesis" is a double-edged enterprise. If on the one hand
it allows for some leeway in the attempt to renew literary theory, if it can be
made to become a central concept in the critical project of evaluation of
works of art, and if it can, up to a certain point, threaten acquired modes of
thinking whose exhaustion has become manifest today, is it legitimate to
assert that a revived mimesis can inaugurate a radical break in literary
thinking?
I have postponed until now confrontation with a question that was
already announced earlier. It has to do with Costa Lima's historical schema:
having ourselves reached the accomplishment of the Romantic poetics of
expressiveness, mimesis returns as a necessary task for thinking, but it
should not return as imitatio. Why does mimesis need to return? Presumably, only because mimesis is the unthought in immanentist poetics. At the
end of modernity, we must think modernity's unthought: that is, we must
think the sense out of which modernity arises. For Costa Lima, breaking
away from modernity cannot mean starting anew. It means precisely
thinking about the break. How does the break figure in mimesis?
Commenting upon what he calls "the first theory of literature" (76),
that of Friedrich Schlegel, Costa Lima remarks that Schlegel rejected the
possibility of a reunification of poiesis and mimesis. Schlegel held fast to a
notion of poiesis as the "unconscious figuration" of genius (86) making it
impossible "to overcome the conundrum that the postulation of autonomous art has never overcome: the fact that the poietic product has no say
about its own circulation and, therefore, about the way its social function is
construed" (86).
But Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has shown that poiesis as the figuration
of genius is in fact perfectly consonant with the Greek notion of mimesis. Ile
refers to Aristotle's Physics B 194a, "hi techni mimeitai ten phusis" ("art
imitates nature") and to B 199a: "On the one hand, teciuil carries out
(accomplishes, perfects, epitilei) that which physis is incapable of settinginto-work (apergasasthai); on the other hand, it imitates" (Limitation 2324). This demonstrates the existence of a double conception of mimesis:
mimesis can be restricted, and that would organize the reproduction of the
given by or in nature; and mimesis can be general:
It does not reproduce anything given (it does not reproduce at all), but
... it supplements a certain default in nature, its incapacity of making,
organizing, working-producing all. It is a productive mimesis, that is,
an imitation of physic as productive fora or, if you prefer, as poiesis.
(2A)

https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol17/iss1/10
But this general mimesis, given that it organizes the field of the Romantic
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figuration-the poet, or the comedian-to come as close as possible to the
pure possibility of itself as precisely a field of figuration: in other words, the
mark of genius would be the radical dis-appropriation of itself. This is what
Lacoue-Labarthe calls the "law of improperty/Impropriety" (impropriEti)
which is "the very law of mimesis" (27).
The law of mimesis would then be paradoxical: itself a law of
dispropriation, it posits itself as absolute propriation. This is in agreement
with Schelling's interpretation of Greek tragedy. For Schelling the tragic
hero-and Oedipus as its prototype-would "manifest his freedom by the
very loss of his freedom" (47). HOlderlin would take this interpretation and
place it at the very origin of speculative dialectics. With it, and in virtue of
their fundamental functioning through the edifice of transcendental idealism, mimesis and the mimetic exchange come to be "accomplished ontotheo-logy" (39). Which also means that they touch the very limit of
ontotheology, and therefore the point of its catastrophe. Lacoue-Labarthe
recognizes in HOlderlin's concept of "caesura" ("the pure word, the
ant irhythmic interruption" [68]) the place where that catastrophe is named
as such: a place of interruption, the figure of a break.?
Mimesis returns, at the end of modernity, as the unthought in modernity. Mimesis is unthought because its catastrophic stance will not let itself
be thought. As accomplished ontotheology, mimesis remains the task for
thought: the mode of its return is not that of a resurrection. Rather, mimesis
returns because, like Antigone's brothers, it has never been properly buried.
Mourning for mimesis has not come to an end. Mourning is still
unaccomplished. It will cause political disruptions. It already has. At the
limit of modernity, insofar as the work of mourning is uneffected, mourning
remains the task for thought. Thought cannot be but mourning: following
the law of mimesis, which says that we cannot return to the proper unless we
disappropriate ourselves from whatever has us haunted, that is, inhabited:
for we still are, if posthumously, the mimes of /mhos, as Parmenides would
have it.

Notes
1. Costa Lima's project has a prolonged life: it encompasses Mimesis e
modernidade and the trilogy of which the book under review here is the first
volume: 0 controle do imaginario,Sociedade e discurso ficciona1,0 Fingidor
e o censor. Cf. also A Aguarrds do tempo. Estudos sobre a narrativa. The
recent English edition of The Dark Side of Reason. Fictionality and Power
translates essays from Sociedade and Fingidor, and includes some new
material. For reasons of space I will limit myself to the discussion of several
key concepts as they are articulated in The Control of the Imaginary. A fuller
treatment would call for references to, for instance, chapter 5 of Sociedade
and chapter 5 of Fingidor. I would also have liked to comment on Roland
Published
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2. The most provoking recent contributions to the debate on mimesis that

I know are to be found in Rend Girard, Violence and the Sacred; Jacques
Derrida, "La double stance" and "Economimesis;" Philippe LacoueLabarthe, "Typographic" and L'imitation des modernes; Paul Ricoeur,
Temps et rEcii, in particular the first volume; and Vincent F. Gugino, "On
Ethos." Sec also in general Agacinski et al., Mimesis desarticulations.
3. The references are to the Freudian notion of identification as developed
in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.
4. Lacoue-Labarthe also talks of mimesis as staging: "c'est essentiellement
k theatre-le fait du theatre ou la thtatralite-qui rend raison dc la
fonction generale de suppleance dtvolue a fart" (L'Imitation 25).
5. Cf. Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction:" "That which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura
of the work of art" (221); he talks about the "decay of the aura" and its
transformation in 222 passim.
6. De Man develops the concept in "Phenomenality and Materiality in
Kant." See comments in Gasche and Redfield.
7. "La cesure du speculatir is the name of the essay where LacoueLabarthe basically develops the concept. But see also La fiction du politique
41-47. Cf. also the related concept of "disaster" in Maurice Blanchot, The
Writing of the Disaster, especially: "The disaster, unexperienced. It is what
escapes the very possibility of experience-it is the limit of writing. This
must be repeated: the disaster de-scribes. Which does not mean that the
disaster, as the force of writing, is excluded from it, is beyond the pale of

writing or extratextual" (7).
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